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FOREWORD
National security policymakers are continuously
challenged to ensure that the judgments and assumptions underlying policy, force posture, and provision
are congruent with the international environment and
the role the United States is playing within it. This
has become problematic in the 21st century security
environment characterized by complexity, connectivity, and rapid change. This analysis offers key insights
into what is a shifting security environment and considers how the United States can best respond to it. Dr.
Phil Williams argues that we have passed the zenith
of the Westphalian state, which is now in long-term
decline, and are already in what several observers
have termed the New Middle Ages, characterized by
disorder but not chaos. Dr. Williams suggests that both
the relative and absolute decline in state power will
not only continue but will accelerate, taking us into a
New Dark Age where the forces of chaos could prove
overwhelming. He argues that failed states are not an
aberration but an indication of intensifying disorder,
and suggests that the intersection of problems such
as transnational organized crime, terrorism, and
pandemics could intersect and easily create a tipping
point from disorder into chaos.
Dr. Williams suggests that analysts and policymakers are reluctant to acknowledge the pace and
scope of state decline. He argues that continued
assumptions about the central role and vitality of
states—a phenomenon he terms “stateocentrism”—
blinds us to emerging challenges. The exception is the
Joint Operational Environment, which offers critically
important insights into emerging challenges. Yet
even this, Dr. Williams argues, focuses on defeating
enemies rather than managing conditions of chaos
v

and restoring order, and remains overly optimistic. He
suggests that many of the problems which are proving
particularly intractable in Iraq exemplify—albeit on a
small scale—the kind of challenges associated with a
New Dark Age. Against this background, Dr. Williams
outlines the strengths and weaknesses of three major
choices: preventive interventionism, disengagement
and mitigation, and triage or selective interventionism.
He suggests that for both a continuation of the
current approach and for selective intervention,
U.S. policymakers have to design a far more holistic
approach to the exercise of power. In the future, for
any substantial U.S. military intervention (by the
United States acting alone or with allies) to have any
chance of success will require what is termed in this
monograph a transagency organizational structure. A
whole of government approach cannot simply replicate
in the field the institutional rivalries and divergences
prevalent in Washington. Military forces, diplomats,
reconstruction specialists, and legal experts must be
integrated into one organization designed to assist a
target state in reestablishing its authority, legitimacy,
and effectiveness. Whether or not one agrees with the
gloomy prognosis of this analysis, the author identifies
trends and potential challenges that will have an impact
on U.S. strategy and military posture in the next few
decades and offers some suggestions about possible
responses.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Security and stability in the 21st century have little
to do with traditional power politics, military conflict
between states, and issues of grand strategy. Instead,
they revolve around governance, public safety,
inequality, urbanization, violent nonstate actors, and
the disruptive consequences of globalization. This
monograph seeks to explore the implications of these
issues for the future U.S. role in the world, as well as
for its military posture and strategy.
Underlying the change from traditional geopolitics
to security as a governance issue is the long-term decline
of the state. Despite state resilience, this trend could
prove unstoppable. If so, it will be essential to replace
dominant state-centric perceptions and assessments
(what the author terms “stateocentrism”) with alternative judgments acknowledging the reduced role
and diminished effectiveness of states. This alternative
assessment has been articulated most effectively in the
notion of the New Middle Ages in which the state is
only one of many actors, and the forces of disorder
loom large. The concept of the New Middle Ages is
discussed in Section II, which suggests that global
politics are now characterized by fragmented political
authority, overlapping jurisdictions, no-go zones,
identity politics, and contested property rights.
Failure to manage the forces of global disorder,
however, could lead to something even more forbidding—a New Dark Age. Accordingly, Section III
identifies and elucidates key developments that are not
only feeding into the long-term decline of the state but
seem likely to create a major crisis of governance that
could tip into the chaos of a New Dark Age. Particular
attention is given to the inability of states to meet the
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needs of their citizens, the persistence of alternative
loyalties, the rise of transnational actors, urbanization
and the emergence of alternatively governed spaces,
and porous borders. These factors are likely to interact
in ways that could lead to an abrupt, nonlinear shift
from the New Middle Ages to the New Dark Age. This
will be characterized by the spread of disorder from the
zone of weak states and feral cities in the developing
world to the countries of the developed world. When
one adds the strains coming from global warming and
environmental degradation, the diminution of cheaply
available natural resources, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the challenges will be
formidable and perhaps overwhelming.
These challenges will also have profound implications for U.S. security policy and military strategy. Reflecting this, Section IV considers the extent to which
these trends and challenges have been incorporated
into official thinking about U.S. national security
policy, military posture, and strategy. Although there
is considerable sensitivity to the need to adapt to a more
complex, dynamic, and unpredictable environment,
the continued focus on defeating enemies rather than
managing conditions of complexity and even chaos is
overly narrow. At best, the official assessments remain
linear in terms of projections about states—and even
when the focus is on state weakness, the emphasis
remains on adversaries rather than the environment
itself.
Consequently, Section V considers how—in the
event the prognosis of state decline and emerging
chaos is correct—the United States might seek to
adapt its policies and strategies. Several different
options are explored. These range from the adoption of
vigorous preventive measures at one extreme to global
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disengagement at the other. The first option seeks
to quarantine and contain disorder and chaos as far
from the United States as possible. The second option
seeks to quarantine the United States itself, thereby
protecting it from the most serious consequences of
an inexorable trend. A third option, lying somewhere
between these extremes, offers a more selective and
differentiated strategy. For both the first and the third
options, the United States would need a far more
holistic approach to the exercise of power and a far
more coherent organizational structure than currently
exist. In responding to security challenges, the United
States develops several strands of distinct and often
independent activities rather than a sustained strategic
approach that integrates multiple activities and directs
them towards a common purpose.
In a world where the United States seeks to
combat extensive disorder and restore stability,
military, economic, and diplomatic power have to
be targeted in ways that create synergies rather than
seams, that reinforce rather than undercut, and that
provide maximum efficiency and effectiveness. U.S.
interventions would have to be smarter, not harder.
The problem is that effective strategies of intervention
and reconstruction require more than the coordination
of disparate elements. Strategy cannot be patched
together. At the very least, it requires going beyond
interagency collaboration to develop what might be
termed transagency organizational structures. Based
on but extending the task force concept, a transagency
structure would be a central core of U.S. interventionist
capabilities. It would include military forces, diplomats, reconstruction specialists, and legal experts
integrated into one organization designed to assist a
target state in reestablishing its authority, legitimacy,
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and effectiveness. Notions of joint operations would be
extended beyond the military to civilian institutions,
replace departmental loyalties with a sense of loyalty
to the mission, and focus on synergistic effects.
Without both organizational innovation and a shift of
organizational cultures and loyalties, tactical success
is unlikely—even if there is selective and limited
intervention.
The caution is that tactical success might not
translate into strategic success. After all, the state does
not necessarily represent the optimum set of political
arrangements for meeting people’s needs or for ensuring peace and stability. More organic, bottom-up
forms of governance, for all their shortcomings, might
be the best available in a world of increasingly hollow
and failing states. The fixation with the centralized state
needs to confront realities that point towards serious
consideration of alternatives. The problem is that the
stateocentric mode of thinking is so highly normative
that consideration of alternative forms of governance,
which does more than treat them as threats, is typically
regarded as heretical, irrelevant, or misguided. Yet if
we fail to see the decline of the state and to recognize
the underlying realities, the prospect of a cascade of
strategic surprises and a series of strategic disasters is
inescapable.

xii

FROM THE NEW MIDDLE AGES
TO A NEW DARK AGE:
THE DECLINE OF THE STATE
AND U.S. STRATEGY
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
In the 21st century in most parts of the world,
issues of security and stability have little to do with
traditional power politics, military conflict between
states, and issues of grand strategy. Instead they revolve
around the disruptive consequences of globalization,
governance, public safety, inequality, urbanization,
violent nonstate actors and the like. This monograph
seeks to explore the implications of these disruptions
for the future of the U.S. role in the world, as well as for
its military posture and strategy.
Underlying the change from traditional geopolitics
to security as a governance issue is the long-term decline
of the state. Despite state resilience, this trend could
prove unstoppable. If so, it will be essential to replace
dominant state-centric perceptions and assessments
with alternative judgments acknowledging the
reduced role and diminished effectiveness of states.
This alternative assessment has been most effectively
articulated in the notion of the New Middle Ages in
which the state is only one of many actors, and the
forces of disorder loom large. Consequently, the New
Middle Ages is discussed in Section II. Failure to
manage the forces of global disorder, however, could
lead to something even more forbidding—a New Dark
Age. Accordingly, Section III identifies and elucidates
key developments that are not only feeding into the
long-term decline of the state, but seem likely to create
a major crisis of governance that could tip into the

1

chaos of a New Dark Age. At the very least, such a
crisis will have profound implications for U.S. security
policy and military strategy.
Reflecting this, Section IV considers the extent
to which these trends and challenges have been
incorporated into official thinking about U.S. national
security policy, military posture, and strategy.
Although there is considerable sensitivity to the need to
adapt to a more complex, dynamic, and unpredictable
environment, the continued focus on defeating enemies
rather than managing conditions of complexity and
even chaos is overly narrow. At best, the official
assessments remain linear in terms of projections about
states—and even when the focus is on state weakness,
the emphasis remains on adversaries rather than the
environment itself.
Consequently, Section V considers how—in the
event the prognosis of state decline and emerging
chaos is correct—the United States might seek to
adapt its policies and strategies. Several different
options are explored. These range from the adoption of
vigorous preventive measures at one extreme to global
disengagement at the other. The first option seeks
to quarantine and contain disorder and chaos as far
from the United States as possible. The second option
seeks to quarantine the United States itself, thereby
protecting it from the most serious consequences of
an inexorable trend. A third option, lying somewhere
between these extremes, offers a more selective and
differentiated strategy. Whatever strategic choices are
made, however, the consequences for the U.S. military
and its roles and missions will be far-reaching. Before
examining the menu of choices, it is necessary to explore
more fully why the state is in long-term decline.
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Observers who see the dominance of states in
world politics as immutable reject the decline thesis.
They dismiss the weakness of many states with the
argument that most of these were never more than
“quasi-states” in the first place.1 Moreover, the contrast
between states in Africa, for example, and the advanced
post-industrial states of the developed world is so stark
that assessments of the former seem to have little or
no applicability to the latter. Consequently, arguments
about the decline of the state tend to be dismissed—
like reports of Mark Twain’s death—as somewhat
premature. Certainly, it is “too early to schedule a wake
for the sovereign-state system.”2 The state remains the
main construct for political allegiance and affiliation,
the ostensible provider of security to its citizens, and
the key organizing device for world politics.
None of this is inconsistent with the notion that
the Westphalian state system is in a long recession.
States, having reached the zenith of their power in the
totalitarian systems of the 20th century, are in a period
of absolute decline. The challenges from contemporary
globalization and other pressures are neither novel nor
unique, but are more formidable than in the past—
while the ability of states to respond effectively to
these challenges is not what it was. In a sense, states are
being overwhelmed by complexity, fragmentation, and
demands that they are simply unable to meet. They are
experiencing an unsettling diminution in their capacity
to manage political, social, and economic problems
that are increasingly interconnected, intractable,
and volatile. States are also undergoing a relative
decline, challenged in both overt and subtle ways by
the emergence of alternative centers of power and
authority.3 Sometimes decline is dramatic and overt,
but much of it is subtle and gradual. At some point,
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however, changes in degree can become a change in
kind. A multitude of incremental shifts, especially if
combined with powerful trigger events, can create a
major tipping point, where the Westphalian state moves
from stability to instability, from high to low levels of
performance and legitimacy, and from untrammeled
dominance to a loss of centrality.
Scholars and policymakers who remain staunchly
state-centric dismiss this notion of a fundamental
long-term transformation. In effect, they suffer from
“stateocentrism”—a term having the same kind of
pejorative connotations as ethnocentrism. To argue this
is not to ignore the power of the ingrained assumptions
and attitudes underlying the “stateocentric” mindset.
After all, for the most part, states follow certain norms
and rules, are predictable in their behavior, and exhibit
high levels of rationality. Stateocentrism is very
comfortable—it is parsimonious, reflects powerful if
partial realities, and has the great virtue of familiarity.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001
(9/11), for example, there were arguments from
many quarters—including former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey—suggesting
that a transnational network was incapable of carrying
out such an operation without state sponsorship or
at the very least state support.4 Such an assessment
underestimated the capacity of violent nonstate actors
to develop plans that were simultaneously simple and
sophisticated, exploited U.S. infrastructure as a delivery
system, and had effects grossly disproportionate to
their capabilities.
Similarly, failed states are seen as aberrations
or anomalies rather than as indications of a longterm structural decline of the Westphalian state.
More specifically, in Iraq the idea of a viable central
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government has dominated U.S. planning and policy
even though the political and sectarian divisions seem
to preclude the central government from developing
the level of legitimacy and effectiveness that is
necessary for the restoration of an effective Iraqi state.5
Moreover, Iraq is a powerful example of how violent
nonstate actors such as militias can become proxies for
the state in the provision of security to portions of the
population. Stateocentrism tends to blind its adherents
to the democratization and diffusion of coercive power
to these nonstate actors. This has more recently been
evident, for example, in a growing tendency to dismiss
9/11 as simply a blip rather than an indicator of a
major change in world politics.6 Skepticism of this kind
about the terrorist threat is unlikely to be dispelled by
anything less than another major attack on the U.S.
homeland. Yet, even without such an attack, these
stateocentric perspectives are increasingly tenuous.
Transnational networks and forces of disorder are
seriously redrawing the maps of the world—and
the lines that demarcate nation-states are becoming
increasingly notional, if not wholly fictional. At the
same time power and authority are moving away
from states to other actors. These trends must now be
examined.
II. THE NEW MIDDLE AGES
Many of the characteristics of the state system that
have long been taken for granted are now in question—
and will become increasingly so in the future. Robert
Kaplan forcefully articulated this view in the 1990s.
Unfortunately, the hyperbole inherent in his vision
of the coming anarchy enabled critics to dismiss the
alarming trends and developments he identified.7
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Ironically, most of these trends and developments
have subsequently intensified rather than abated.
Had Kaplan argued not that the future of the world
was Sierra Leone, but simply that the future of large
swaths of the world was Sierra Leone, then his thesis
would have been compelling. The kind of future he
discussed has been captured systematically in the
notion variously characterized as the New Middle
Ages, new medievalism, or neo-medievalism.
Initially developed and dismissed by both Arnold
Wolfers and Hedley Bull, the concept of the New Middle
Ages has been best articulated in a doctoral thesis at
the University of Pittsburgh by Gregory O’Hayon and
in articles by Philip Cerny and Jorg Friedrichs.8 Mark
Duffield, in a succinct summary of Cerny’s analysis,
suggests that global politics is characterized by several
mutually interlocking and reinforcing conditions
which give it a neo-medieval quality. These include:
• “Competing institutions with overlapping
jurisdictions” between states and other actors.9
As societies and economies have become more
complex, states no longer have a monopoly on
functions or responsibilities. Even strong and rich
states choose to privatize certain functions or coopt nongovernmental organizations. For weak
states, however, the sharing of responsibilities
and indeed authority is not so much a choice as
a result of their own shortcomings. The irony,
as discussed more fully below, is that when the
state is already weak, the sharing of governance
tends to undermine rather than strengthen state
authority and legitimacy.
• “More fluid territorial boundaries (both within
and across states).”10 Borders have never been
fully impermeable. Nevertheless, in what has
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become regarded as a global “space of flows,”
control over borders is increasingly problematic.11 This, too, is discussed more fully below.
Suffice it to suggest here, however, that borders
are not lines on maps but organic spaces which
develop their own character and dynamism—
often in ways that are inconsistent with the
objectives and values of central governments.
• “Inequality and marginalization of various
groups.”12 These groups exist to one degree
or another within all societies, although the
proportion of a country’s population they
represent varies enormously from developed to
developing countries. In many African and Latin
American countries, marginalized individuals
and groups make up the large majority of
the population. Their deprivation is starkly
underlined by its juxtaposition with the wealth
of the political and business elites, wealth that is
often displayed in very ostentatious ways.
• “Multiple or fragmented loyalties and identities.”13 Largely obscured by the Cold War,
issues of identity, ethnicity, and loyalty have
come back to the forefront. In the Balkans during
the 1990s, they resulted in ethnic cleansing and
large-scale atrocities; in some African countries,
the result was genocide. In other parts of the
world, identity politics has resulted in the rise
of militant Islamic groups with a propensity for
violence.
• “Contested property rights, legal statutes, and
conventions.”14 In some parts of the world,
especially urban slums in many developing
countries—which are discussed more fully
below—the contest is between formal property
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rights and the de facto property rights of
slum dwellers who often live off the informal
economy and are typically outside the orbit of
state largesse, if not state control.
• “The spread of geographical and social ‘no go
areas’ where the rule of law no longer extends.”15
Notions of ungoverned spaces or lawless areas
increasingly have been seen as a dangerous
phenomenon, especially because they provide
safe havens for terrorists. In fact, many of them
are not so much ungoverned as alternatively
governed by groups which act as surrogates for
the state. The “dons” in the slums of Kingston,
Jamaica, for example, are not merely the heads
of drug trafficking organizations; they are also
the social and economic patrons of marginalized
people who have little or no assistance from
the state. As John Rapley has noted, the dons
provide “a rudimentary welfare safety net by
helping locals with school fees, lunch money,
and employment—a function that the Jamaican
government used to perform. But over the last
couple of decades, keen to reduce spending,
it has scaled back many of its operations,
leaving a vacuum. As one kind of authority has
withdrawn, another has advanced.”16 While
particularly stark in Jamaica, this phenomenon
is also present in many other countries.
• “A growing disarticulation between the
dynamic and technologically innovative north
and the south.”17 At one level, this observation
is very compelling—and is hard to disagree
with. Yet, within the south, there are varying
degrees of growth and deprivation. Paul Collier,
for example, has noted that there is “a group of
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countries at the bottom that are falling behind,
and often falling apart.”18 Encompassing what
Collier terms the “bottom billion” people, these
countries “coexist with the 20th century, but
their reality is the 14th century: civil war, plague,
ignorance.”19 Emphasizing this, however, makes
Cerny’s argument even more compelling.
Cerny himself, having fully elucidated each of these
characteristics of neo-medievalism, concludes with the
suggestion that these elements constitute a long-term
“durable disorder” in which the system as a whole
stumbles along with problems managed and contained
rather than solved.20
Friedrichs, while identifying many of the same
characteristics, adds that the “Middle Ages in Western
Christendom between the 11th and the 14th centuries”
was nevertheless held together by the dual yet competitive universalistic claims of the Empire and the
Church.21 In his view, the notion of the Middle Ages
as a disorderly system ignores the forces which gave it
coherence. He then argues that a similar dualism exists
today with regard to the state on the one side and the
globalized market economy on the other.22 There are
several difficulties with this, however. First, Friedrichs’
discussion of the Middle Ages is highly selective,
both geographically and temporally. Second, even if
we accept that the universalistic claims he identifies
provided a critical degree of order, it is not clear that
either the state or the transnational market economy
can do the same in the 21st century. On the contrary—
as suggested below—globalization, far from helping
to impose a degree of order, actually compounds the
disorder.
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Clearly, Cerny’s encapsulation of the new
medievalism is far more compelling than Friedrichs’,
especially in terms of its emphasis on disorder.
Unlike Friedrichs, Cerny sees contemporary forces
such as globalization and connectivity as having
profoundly negative as well as positive effects. When
combined with technology that has become more
diffused and easily acquired, the result is not only an
empowerment of what James Rosenau almost 20 years
ago termed “sovereignty-free actors,” but also a turbocharging of global politics.23 The speed of travel and
communications, the ease and low cost of business
transactions, the volume and velocity of financial flows,
the pervasiveness of television, and the growing reach
of the Internet have created a world that would be
unintelligible not only to citizens in the Middle Ages,
but also to many of those who lived in the first half of
the 20th century. We live in a somewhat paradoxical
era when political conditions and the dispersion of
authority increasingly resemble the Middle Ages, but
the forces of modernity, technology, and globalization
add a whole new set of challenges to the viability and
integrity of the state system and make the provision
of security—at the national, public, and individual
levels—increasingly problematic. Cerny, of course,
recognizes all this and sums it up in his notion of the
“security deficit.” 24 This is based on the contention that
traditional state approaches to the provision of security
such as the maintenance of a global or regional balance
of power are increasingly irrelevant to contemporary
and future challenges.
At the same time, Cerny contends that “such
turbulence does not necessarily mean chaos.”25
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The medieval order was a highly flexible one that created a wide range of spaces that could accommodate quite
extensive social, economic, and political innovations—
eventually laying the groundwork for the emergence of
the post-feudal, nation-state-based international order.
The 21st-century globalizing world order similarly provides manifold opportunities as well as constraints.26

In effect, he suggests that what is essentially a dark
prognosis has a silver lining. Yet, this might not be
the case. The problem with even this limited degree
of optimism is that disorder itself could prove highly
unpredictable rather than “durable.” It does not
require much imagination to see disorder spread,
intensify, or tip into chaos. The danger is that the New
Middle Ages, rather than being a stopping point, will
be simply an interim stage on the road to a New Dark
Age. The world is already facing not only a “security
deficit” but also, as Cerny acknowledges, a governance
deficit.27 Both will accelerate rather than diminish
in the next few decades. Moreover, the security
deficit and the governance deficit will reinforce one
another in pernicious, unpredictable, and potentially
unmanageable ways.
III. STATE DECLINE, GLOBAL CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW DARK AGE
There are many reasons why the state is in decline,
and why this decline is likely both to accelerate
and to intensify. The difficulty is not so much with
identifying the underlying structural conditions
contributing to what appears to be a long-term secular
trend, but with understanding the cumulative impact
of drivers which are not only interdependent but also
mutually reinforcing. Interdependence, combined with
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persistent and reinforcing feedback loops, ensures that
the impact of these factors is much more than the sum
of their parts. Indeed, decline can easily become selfperpetuating: as states go into decline, other forms of
governance become more important, simultaneously
acting as proxies for states while further reducing
state legitimacy. Keeping this in mind, several
considerations clearly feed into the continued erosion
of state dominance.
The Inability of Most States to Meet the Needs
of Their Citizens.
Many states are increasingly unable to meet the
needs of their citizens. In part this reflects the rise of
complex or “wicked” problems that resist short-term
or readily salable solutions as well as what might be
termed the long-term demography of unemployment.28
Job creation in most countries of the developing world
is already inadequate and will fail to meet the needs of
growing populations, while even in developed countries large segments of immigrant populations—especially youths—remain unemployed, underemployed,
or employed only for the most menial of tasks. For countries such as Nigeria, even if they succeed in overcoming the mix of corruption and incompetence that pervades governance structures, it is unlikely that they will
create sufficient job opportunities for a rapidly growing
population. The result is that the disenfranchised and
alienated segments of society will grow as will disputes
over resources—such as the oil in the Niger Delta. This
is also likely in other African societies where the state,
rather than being above politics, is simply the prize of
politics.29 In these circumstances, politics becomes a
zero-sum game, and the distribution of spoils is heavily
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skewed in the direction of the ethnic group, tribe, clan,
or sectarian faction that is in power. Inevitably this
leads to instability of the kind that erupted in Kenya
in late December 2007 and early 2008, even though the
country was long regarded as one of Africa’s success
stories. Dynamics of this kind have also been evident in
Iraq since the U.S. invasion and have complicated both
reconstruction and the reestablishment of a legitimate
and effective government. The conflict in Basra among
competing Shiite factions and militias, for example, has
little to do with sectarianism and revolves primarily
around the control of oil and oil smuggling.30
Even where this zero-sum dynamic is absent,
weaknesses of the state are debilitating. These
weaknesses can be understood in terms of capacity
gaps and functional holes.31 Gaps in state capacity
lead to an inability to carry out the “normal” and
“expected” functions of the modern Westphalian
state and to make adequate levels of public goods or
collective provision for large parts of the citizenry.
In Latin America, this has resulted in what Gabriel
Marcella described as “inadequate public security
forces, dysfunctional judicial systems, inadequate
jails which become training schools for criminals, and
deficiencies in other dimensions of state structure such
as maintenance of infrastructure.”32 Indeed, Marcella
goes on to argue that “at the turn of the 21st century,
Latin American countries have essentially two states
within their boundaries: the formal and the informal.
They are separate entities often walled off from each
other, though they interact with the informal state
supporting the other.”33 Similar observations have been
made by John Rapley who has argued not only that the
state “lacks the largesse needed to buy the loyalty of an
ever-increasing number of players,” but also that other
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informal forms and structures of governance move in
to replace the state.34
Where the State can no longer provide employment,
build houses, pave roads or police the streets, or where
the police are so woefully underpaid that they supplement their incomes from corruption, sometimes turning
on the very citizens they are meant to protect, in such
cases, private armies and mini-states might fill the vacuum left behind by a retreating state.35

One reason for the resurgence of Sendero Luminoso
in Peru, for example, has been that in most respects,
the state does not exist outside Lima. Over the next
several decades, the state is likely to retreat from more
and more sectors and more and more geographical
areas. Although Marcella and Rapley focus primarily
on Latin America and the Caribbean, their comments
apply equally in many other parts of the world, most
particularly Africa and Central Asia.
The Persistence of Alternative Loyalties.
A second problem for states is what might be
described as alternative loyalties of significant portions
of the population. This can have several reasons, the
most obvious of which is the lack of congruence between
state and nation. For the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, for
example, national citizenship is less important than
ethnic identity. It could be argued, of course, that this
is simply because the Kurds want their own state—so
it is the particular state arrangement in question rather
than the state itself. Even if this is accepted in the
Kurdish case, a broader trend is apparent in which lack
of primary affiliation with the state and the resurgence
of primordial loyalties—to family, clan, tribe, ethnic
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group, religion, or sect—has created a crisis of loyalty
among significant and often growing segments of
“national” populations. Indeed, David Ronfeldt has
described tribes as “the first and forever form” of social
organization.36 As he has noted: “even for modern
societies that have advanced far beyond a tribal stage,
the tribe remains not only the founding form but also
the forever form and the ultimate fallback form.”37 It
is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that “many of the
world’s current trouble spots—in the Middle East,
South Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Africa—
are in societies so riven by embedded tribal and clan
dynamics that the outlook remains terribly uncertain
for them to build professional states and competitive
businesses that are unencumbered by tribal and clan
dynamics.”38 In Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan in
particular, clans and tribes have complicated efforts to
engage in state making. Nowhere have the fractured
and diffused loyalties been more obvious than in the
Facilities Protection Service, a force set up to guard
ministries and other government installations and
infrastructure in Iraq. Although it is nominally under
the control of the Ministry of Interior, the “allegiance of
many Facilities Protection service personnel has been
to individual ministries, parties, tribes, and clans rather
than to the central government, and such division of
loyalties undermines their ability to provide security.”39
Even the much-vaunted U.S. alliance with Sunni tribes
against al-Qaeda in Iraq has been based on an important
if belated recognition of the significance of tribes and
has led to some short-term success. The danger is that
the long-term construction of a centralized and viable
Iraqi state becomes even more difficult.
Tribes, clans, and the warlords who sometimes
lead them typically define their interests and identities
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in ways that implicitly or explicitly challenge notions
of public interest and collective identity as symbolized
in state structures and institutions.40 This is both
possible and persuasive because, in some respects, the
nonstate actors have more legitimacy then the state. As
Zonabend noted: “The lineage or clan is more than a
group of relatives united by privileged ties; it is also
a corporate group, whose members support each
other, act together in all circumstances, whether ritual
or everyday, jointly own and exploit assets and carry
out, from generation to generation, the same political,
religious, or military functions.”41 Few states have
this kind of unity—except under conditions of total
warfare.
Significantly, criminal organizations also exhibit
some of the same features as tribes and clans. Many
criminal organizations—although certainly not all—
have an ethnic, family, tribal, or even geographical
basis. Even when this is not the case, bonding mechanisms—which can include time spent together in prison or simply working together in risky conditions—
play an important role.42 Although an increasing number
of criminal organizations appear to be cosmopolitan in
membership, the more important ones are still based
on family ties or common ethnicity. Strong internal
affiliation is often accompanied by hostility towards
outsiders. It is not surprising, therefore, that warfare
between competing criminal organizations is often
based on family or clan rivalries in which revenge
and vendettas are the contemporary forms of blood
feuds. The clash between the Mexican drug trafficking
organizations led by the Arellano Felix family and
the Gulf drug trafficking organization on the one
side and by Chapo Guzman of the Sinaloa and Juarez
organizations on the other have been partly about the
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control of drug trafficking routes and markets, but they
have also been fuelled and intensified by the killing of
family members and the desire for revenge. Inherent
in both the sense of identity and the willingness to use
force is a challenge to state dominance. This has even
been true in the United States where the Mafia which
arose from medieval conditions in Sicily . . . succeeded
precisely as a medieval anachronism in counterpoint to
modern culture, each provoking and irritating the other.
Modernity broke society down into atoms of mobile,
free-floating unaffiliated individuals with ultimate loyalties only to the state and its laws. The Mafia insisted on
the enduring primacy of family, geography, ethnicity,
and ultimate loyalties to persons and the Mafia itself—
the group over the individual. Instead of contractual,
legalistic, or economic ties, the Mafia bound its men
with personalized relations of reciprocal obligation.43

For the members, the organization was more important
than the state or its laws. A similar dynamic is evident
in Islamic terrorist organizations.
Perhaps nowhere have identities, loyalties,
and obligations surpassing and transcending the
relationship with the state been more evident than
in the rise of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. The
real genius of bin Laden and Zawahiri, as well as of
jihadi theorists such as Setmariam Nasr, has been in
the use of “grievance narratives” to create a sense of
Moslem identity.44 This sense of identity, loyalty, and
obligation, encouraged through radical mosques,
personal affiliations, and the Internet, not only
transcends and trumps citizenship but also encourages
citizens’ hostility towards the states in which they live.
The vision of the new Islamic Caliphate—even though
merely a long-term aspiration—is at one level a frontal
challenge to the nation-state, especially as the loyalties
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it creates are most evident in radicalization and have
as their ultimate expression the suicide bomber. It
also suggests that although Huntington’s clash of
civilizations is not necessarily the defining framework
for understanding global politics in the 21st century, it
does feed into the new medievalism.45 Religious wars
were an important feature of the Middle Ages and
have resurfaced today.
In sum, the sense of affiliation with other groups,
while often coexisting easily with loyalty to the state,
can also work against the state. Moreover, as the state
increasingly fails to provide adequately for its citizens,
it is likely that these alternative loyalties and the
organizational forms that accompany them will become
increasingly important. From a state perspective, this
can be understood as negative synergy.
The Rise of “Sovereignty Free” Transnational
Actors.
The relative decline of the state is also linked very
closely to the rise of empowered nonstate actors in
the form of “dark networks.”46 In part, this reflects the
fact that many states have inadequate social control
mechanisms, and weak law enforcement and criminal
justice systems. Yet other considerations have also fed
into the rise of transnational criminal organizations.
When states are failing or inadequate in terms of
economic management and the provision of social
welfare, the resulting functional hole creates pressures
and incentives for citizens to engage in criminal
activities. Amid conditions of economic hardship,
extra-legal means of obtaining basic needs often become
critical to survival. For countries in which there is no
social safety net, resort to the informal economy and
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to illicit activities is a natural response to the economic
and social gaps created by the weakness or failure of the
state. From this perspective, the growth of organized
crime and drug trafficking, along with the expansion
of prostitution, can be understood as rational responses
to dire economic conditions and circumstances. Such
activities are, in part, coping mechanisms in countries
characterized by poverty, poor governance, and
ineffective markets. Furthermore, organized crime is a
highly effective form of entrepreneurship, providing
economic opportunities and multiplier benefits that
would otherwise be absent in feeble or dysfunctional
economies. Illicit means of advancement offer
opportunities that are simply not available in the licit
economy. The difficulty, of course, is that the filling of
functional spaces by organized crime perpetuates the
weakness of the state.
In contrast, the power of criminal organizations
(along with that of clans, warlords, and ethnic factions)
is increased by connections outside the state. According
to Shultz and Dew, “one of the more disturbing trends
of nonstate armed groups is the extent to which
such groups, including these clan-based groups,
are cooperating and collaborating with each other
in networks that span national borders and include
fellow tribal groups, criminal groups, and corrupt
political elements.”47 Similarly, many transnational
criminal organizations have recognized the benefits
of cooperation with their counterparts elsewhere.
Russian criminals and Colombian drug trafficking
organizations, Italian mafias, and Albanian clans, and
even Japanese and Chinese criminals have worked
together when it has been mutually advantageous.
Criminals also seek to co-opt representatives of the
state, in some cases creating what Roy Godson termed
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the “political–criminal nexus.”48 In the past, the political
elites such as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
in Mexico and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union
were often the dominant partner in this relationship;
increasingly though, criminal organizations appear
to be in the stronger position. This, in turn, further
erodes state authority. In yet other cases, there is also
cooperation between criminals and terrorists. Although
this should not be exaggerated—and it typically occurs
when terrorist organizations are engaged in criminal
activities to fund themselves—it cannot be ignored.
Even where such collaboration does not occur, many
criminal networks operate in a transnational manner,
engaging in jurisdictional arbitrage to both maximize
profits (selling illicit and trafficked commodities where
the price is high) and minimize risk. In effect, therefore,
state authority is subject to challenge both from within
by nonstate armed groups and from without by
transnational movements, organizations, and forces.
In this connection, it bears emphasis that it was
a network based organization, al-Qaeda, which, at
least symbolically, challenged U.S. hegemony when
there was no peer state competitor. The more modest,
but highly disconcerting, ability of nonstate actors to
become spoilers has been evident in Iraq. The United
States, in turn, has rediscovered the challenge of
transforming its overwhelming military and economic
power into an effective strategy for rebuilding a viable
Iraqi state. The old notion that power is relative to the
contingencies for which it is used has been underlined
by the contrast between the rapid U.S. victory on the
battlefield and the protracted difficulties it has faced
in developing adequate responses to the challenges
of security, stability, and reconstruction. Indeed,
in looking at Iraq what emerges most clearly is the
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ability of the various nonstate actors such as the
Shiite militias—especially the Badr Organization and
Jaish al Mahdi—as well as the Sunni tribes to hinder,
complicate, and undermine the efforts to establish an
effective and legitimate Iraqi state.
The Rise of Cities and the Emergence
of Alternatively Governed Spaces.
One area in which the New Middle Ages resembles
the Middle Ages of the past is in the importance of cities.
In the medieval world, towns and cities, although much
smaller than those of today, became centers of social
activity and hubs of commerce as well as incubators
of disease. In the last 50 years or so, the rise of cities
has become an enduring and significant trend and has
reached a point at which more than half the world’s
population lives in cities. A possible implication of this
is that cities will increasingly become an alternative
focus to the state as an organizing device for economic,
political, and social activities. Many cities are also
becoming increasingly ungovernable—a trend that can
only feed into what appears to be an impending crisis
of governance at national, regional, and global levels.
The latter half of the 20th century was characterized
by the large-scale migration of population from rural
to urban areas. This movement—and the resulting
transformation of urban spaces—was particularly
pronounced in the developing world. In 1950, New
York was the only city in the world with more than
10 million inhabitants. By 1995, there were 14 such
cities—mostly in the developing world.49 By 2015,
there will be 23—with 19 in the developing world.50
In addition, by 2015, “the number of urban areas with
populations between five and ten million will shoot
from 7 to 37.”51
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According to UN-Habitat, almost one billion
people (one out of every six people in the world)
live in slums which typically lack adequate shelter
and basic services.52 The problems in these spaces
include widespread poverty, overcrowding, disease,
environmental degradation, and pervasive crime and
violence. Many have areas which are so violent that
even law enforcement agencies regard them as no-go
zones. Furthermore, conditions are unlikely to improve
in the near future as slums continue to expand. The UNHabitat Report on the State of the World’s Cities, 2006/7
described slums as the “emerging human settlements
of the 21st century.”53 It also noted that “urbanization
has become virtually synonymous with slum growth,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, Western Asia, and
Southern Asia.”54 According to one analysis, “there are
probably more than 200,000 slums on earth. The five
great metropolises of South Asia (Karachi, Mumbai,
Delhi, Kolkota and Dhaka) alone contain about 15,000
distinct slum communities whose total population
exceeds 20 million.”55 Characterized by inadequate
housing, over-crowding, limited access to water and
sanitation, and lack of property rights, slums are areas
where “the idea of an interventionist state strongly
committed to social housing and job development
seems either a hallucination or a bad joke, because
governments long ago abdicated any serious effort to
combat slums and redress urban marginality.”56 What
makes this all the more serious is that by 2030 the
number of people living in slums worldwide is expected
to reach two billion people.57 To put this in perspective,
the population of China today is somewhere around
1.3 billion people.
Against this background, Richard Norton developed the concept of “feral cities” to describe concentra-
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ted urban spaces that are no longer under the rule of
law.58 In effect, these cities are failed or failing. Using a
term typically applied to domestic animals which have
gone wild, Norton argues that the problems besetting
mega-cities could also become evident in many smaller
cities. These problems, of course, are not the result of
urban growth per se, but its interaction with other factors
such as economic crises, high levels of unemployment,
and weak and inadequate governance—at both the
state and city levels.59 The result is that mega-cities
and even many smaller cities are being transformed
into disorderly spaces where aspirations are rarely
fulfilled and most new urban dwellers find that they
have merely traded a life of rural destitution for one
of urban destitution. For unemployed young men
suffering from what Castells describes as a process of
social exclusion, crime, random or organized, is one of
the few available career options.60
The growth of violent and organized crime is
particularly evident where slum conditions and poverty
are juxtaposed with the secure gated communities
of the wealthy. The contrast is particularly stark in
Brazil. In São Paulo, for example, “the rich are often
unfathomably rich, and the poor are disastrously poor.
Crime and violence flourish any place where jobs are
few, youth are many, and the chasm between rich
and poor becomes too deep and too obvious.”61 For
the poor in the favelas, the drug economy is a crucial
safety net. Furthermore, in both Rio de Janeiro and São
Paulo, drug traffickers who operate in, through, and
out of the favelas have developed alternative forms of
governance based on rudimentary but effective forms
of paternalism, the provision of welfare services,
a degree of protection against violence, and career
opportunities for young men who would otherwise
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be unemployed. Governance of this kind is not
altruistic; it is designed primarily to maintain a safe
haven for the trafficking networks. Those helped by
the traffickers become sources of information and
support, thereby enhancing the intelligence capabilities
of the criminal network. In this sense, a degree of
reciprocity is expected. Nevertheless, the paternalism
of the trafficking networks can also be understood
as an organic form of governance which is at least
partially attuned to the needs of the people deprived
of economic opportunity. After all, these people have
been neglected or ignored by the state and left to fend
for themselves. In these circumstances, to suggest that
the governance provided by the trafficking networks is
an inferior form of governance is beside the point; it is
the only form of governance—albeit one that inherently
challenges the legitimacy of the state.
Not surprisingly, therefore, favelas in both São
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro suffer from regular outbreaks
of violence as both rival trafficking organizations and
police and traffickers vie for control. In effect, the
organic or bottom-up governance is contested—at least
intermittently—by the state.62 Although the favelas
have governance, therefore, they also have considerable
violence, which sometimes spills over to other parts
of the cities. In May 2006, for example, in response to
a plan to move major drug traffickers to a different
prison, the leaders of the First Capital Command in São
Paulo orchestrated a wave of violence in which “more
than 160 people, including at least 75 police and prison
guards” were killed, police posts, bars, and banks were
attacked, riots occurred in 80 prisons, and at least 59
buses were burned.63 In effect, the city was brought to
a standstill.
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Although it might appear contrived to compare the
problems in some of Iraq’s major cities with those in
Rio and São Paulo, the parallels are, in many respects,
very striking. In Sadr City, which is simultaneously a
Shiite ghetto, one of Baghdad’s most deprived areas,
and one of its most obvious concentrations of urban
dwellers, governance, so far as it exists, is provided
by Jaish al Mahdi (JAM). The Mahdi Army has been
both protector and predator.64 It controls black market
activities, demands protection payments, and some
of its factions are very violent even in their treatment
of Shiites. At the same time, black market prices of
some commodities are sometimes lower in Sadr City
than elsewhere in Iraq, which suggests that there
is an important paternalistic component to JAM’s
activities.65 Indeed, in early 2008 there were signs that
JAM was taking steps to curb excessive predation and
violence and was killing some of its own members who
overstepped the boundaries of permissible behavior too
often or too overtly.66 When Iraqi government forces
(which had incorporated many members of the Badr
organization, a rival militia which has often clashed
with Mahdi members) and U.S. forces did the same,
however, Mahdi forces reacted violently, resulting in
major fighting in both Basra and Baghdad in late March
2008.
So long as there is a continued juxtaposition
between concentrations of people and the absence
of services and opportunities, the trends towards
urban disorder and the rise of alternative forms of
governance are likely to continue and even intensify.
Disorder in cities takes many forms: riots in Paris,
contract killings in Yekaterinburg, kidnappings in
Metro Manila, and child prostitution in Mumbai. All of
these problems reflect the failure or abdication of the
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state and the rise of alternative forms of governance
that are paternalistic, but are also both predatory and
parasitic. Since it is in cities that the inability of states
to meet the needs of their citizens is most pronounced,
these agents and structures of alternative governance
are essential. As suggested above, they are often the
only form of governance that exists. Yet, even though
they are organic, bottom up, and attuned to the needs
of the population, they are far from ideal. They are
exploitative and often violent in nature. Moreover,
as alternative forms of governance, they are a major
challenge to the dominance of the state.
Another and more surprising challenge to the state
has arisen in prisons. Paradoxically, prisons are both
a monument to the coercive power of the state and
an expression of the limits of that power. Although
the ability to incarcerate (and in many cases execute)
people starkly reflects the coercive power of the state,
prisons are increasingly uncontrollable. At times, it
appears that the prisoners run the prison. Although
the formal structure of incarceration imposes outer
controls, within limits prisoners have a great deal of
freedom—especially where they have the resources
to bribe some of the prison authorities. And prison no
longer isolates inmates from the society in the way it
once did. The widespread availability of “cell” phones
has enabled some prisoners to continue running their
criminal enterprises from prison. Osiel Cardenas,
for example, continued to run his drug trafficking
organization, the “Gulf Cartel” from La Palma prison in
Mexico until, in January 2007, he was extradited to the
United States. Moreover, major criminals can mobilize
resources in the outside world in the event that the
state adopts policies or initiates regulatory measures
they oppose. This has certainly been the case in Brazil
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where the riots discussed above were orchestrated, at
least in part, from prison.
It has long been recognized that prison also acts as
a training ground and finishing school for criminals.
Not only do criminals develop their professional
expertise in prison, but they also build up social capital
that can be very important when they are released. In
this sense, prisons inadvertently help to facilitate the
emergence and expansion of criminal networks. They
also provide an ideal environment in which terrorists
can recruit members of criminal organizations who
bring with them a skill set that can act as a multiplier for
the terrorist organization. Indeed, prisons, especially
in Western Europe and to a degree in the United
States, have become a petri dish for radicalization of
Moslems.67 In other words, many prisons have become
places where criminals conduct business, where they
swell the ranks of terrorist organizations, and where
the authority of the state is systematically undermined
by the corruption of prison officers.
Porous Borders.
One of the most important aspects of sovereignty
is the notion of territorial control—a notion which
extends to determining who and what is allowed to
enter the territory and under what conditions. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the authority of the state is
deeply and obviously embedded in formal points
of entry and departure. In effect, this is where “the
strategy of state territoriality is dramatized and state
sovereignty is paraded. It is also here that many
countervailing strategies contesting state territoriality
are clustered. The struggle between these strategies
continually reproduces, reconstructs, or undermines

27

borders.”68 It is also a struggle between customs officials,
immigration service personnel, and border guards on
the one side and smugglers, illegal migrants, criminals,
and terrorists on the other. For these latter groups,
borders are both obstacles and opportunities. Once the
border has been crossed, all sorts of benefits accrue—
job opportunities for illegal migrants or profits from
illegal goods that have increased significantly in value
from one side of the border to the other. Smugglers also
exploit differential tax rates among countries—which
explains why cigarette smuggling has become a major
issue in Europe and why Turkey (with gasoline prices
among the highest in the world) remained a favorite
destination for smugglers of Iraqi oil and gasoline even
after sanctions against Iraq were removed. Smugglers
also seek to meet the demands for products that are
illegal, regulated, prohibited, or stolen.
The inability of states to control their borders and
the global flows—of people, money, weapons, drugs,
etc.—that cross these borders into their national
territories is both a manifestation of the decline of the
state and a major contributor to the strengthening and
acceleration of this tendency. Although Stephen Krasner
is correct in his observation that states “have never
been able to perfectly regulate transborder flows,”69
it is also arguable that they have never before had to
contend with the sheer volume, speed, and diversity
of the people and commodities that cross their borders
both legally and illegally. As Carolyn Nordstrom has
observed, in the contemporary globalized world, “taxes
and tariffs are obstacles, not obligations.”70 Similarly,
borders might be boundaries, but they are far from
being barriers.
One reason for this is the intermodal container,
a development which both transformed the scale of
global trade by reducing transaction costs, and—in
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spite of such measures as the Container Security
Initiative rolled out by U.S. Customs—helped to deny
states the ability to control what comes across their
borders, unless they are willing to place global trade
on hold. The container ship, with its large numbers
of containers and the ability to move them from ship
to shore quickly and efficiently, has compounded the
inspection challenge.71 The result is that states enjoy
what Nordstrom termed “the illusion of inspection”
but are unable to turn the illusion into reality.72 The
sheer volume of trade, the diversity of commodities,
and the increased reliance of businesses on just-in-time
deliveries all militate against the imposition of truly
effective border controls.
Those who want to bring commodities or people
across borders undetected have a range of options
to exploit. For example, they can simply circumvent
customs posts and come in through remote areas
where checks are nonexistent. Alternatively, they can
facilitate their actions through corruption, which in the
last few years has become a major problem on the U.S.
side of the border with Mexico in spite of (or perhaps
because of) U.S. efforts to impose more stringent border
controls. More often than not, however, concealment
and/or deception are sufficient given the volume of
goods crossing borders and the limited capacity for
search and discovery. The problem for states is that
the smugglers’ toolkit is diverse and flexible in scope
and innovative in method. Mexican drug traffickers,
for example, have dug a significant number of tunnels
from Mexico to the United States, through which
they can move their drugs unhindered. Although 19
of these tunnels were discovered and closed in 2007,
clearly illegal movements across borders of prohibited,
regulated, and stolen goods, as well as of people and
dirty money, are flourishing.73
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So, too, are cross-border digital signals. Ironically,
the Internet, which was a product of the Cold War
between the superpowers, has become a means of
empowerment of individuals, small groups, and small
businesses—often at the expense of the state. In some
instances, states such as Burma are able to clamp
down on Internet access and use, at least temporarily.
Nevertheless, nonstate actors are generally able to use
the Internet as a force multiplier in their competition
with states. Although the Internet is not wholly
unregulated, it is a haven for the sexual predator,
the insurgent looking for international support, the
criminal seeking to move his money covertly, and the
terrorist who uses it to finance and plan and to recruit
and train people for his next attack on state targets.
Indeed, if borders are far more than simply lines on
maps; in cyber-space, they are far less.
Implications: From New Medievalism to the New
Dark Age.
Each of the drivers outlined above poses a formidable set of challenges to the state. The drivers also feed off
one another in ways that are not only mutually reinforcing but multiply the difficulties in developing an adequate response. In complexity terms, they interact in an
emergent system which makes the ultimate outcomes
both synergistic and highly unpredictable. The extent
to which states are able (or unable) to adapt and learn
also adds to the uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is not
hard to envisage the transformation of global politics
and an abrupt, nonlinear shift from the New Middle
Ages to the New Dark Age.
The 21st century will see a continuing dialectic
between the forces of order and the forces of disorder.
Within this co-evolution, the limits of state power will
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become increasingly apparent, while the empowerment
of nonstate actors will increase significantly. Although
some strong legitimate states will continue to exist, the
number of what might be termed qualified, restricted,
notional, or hollow and collapsed states is likely to
increase. Moreover, many of these weaker states will be
neutralized, penetrated, or in some cases even captured
by organized crime, terrorists, militias, warlords, and
other violent nonstate actors. In effect, we will continue
to see a world of formal state structures, but at least
some of these will be little more than fronts for these
other actors. In other instances, the emphasis on formal
sovereignty will do little to obscure the dispersal of real
authority and power among what Rapley described
as “autonomous political agents, equipped with their
own resource bases, which make them resistant to a
reimposition of centralized control.”74
One of the corollaries of this is the spread of
disorder from the zone of weak states and feral cities in
the developing world to the countries of the developed
world. This is recognized, for example, by Collier in
his argument that the problem of the bottom billion
matters, and not just to the . . . people who are living
and dying in 14th century conditions. It matters to us.
The 21st century world of material comfort, global travel, and economic interdependence will become increasingly vulnerable to these large islands of chaos. And it
matters now. As the bottom billion diverges from an
increasingly sophisticated world economy, integration
will become harder not easier.75

This notion of spreading disorder is a very important
antidote to an overly-optimistic Wilsonianism that
sees democracy, liberty, or global economic integration as cure-alls. Thomas Barnett, for example, in
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a sophisticated variant of economic Wilsonianism,
has argued that global security is simply a matter of
inclusion, of bringing states on the periphery into the
world of globalization and making them more like the
core.76 In some ways this is a variant of the argument
developed in the 1990s by Singer and Wildavsky
suggesting that the real world order was made up of
both zones of peace and zones of turmoil.77 For Singer
and Wildavsky, the key was to export democracy and
thereby contain and reduce the turmoil and enlarge
the space in which there was a real sense of order and
stability. Barnett’s twist on this is simply the emphasis
on economic integration into the developed world—
and in particular the need to integrate states which
are economically isolated. He argues, for example,
that one of the most positive consequences of the U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan is the prospect that this
will help to integrate the country into the core of the
global economy. The problem with this argument is
that Afghanistan is already fully integrated into the
global economy—albeit the illicit global economy.
Connectivity and integration have multiple layers and
facets. Moreover, opium and heroin radiate out from
Afghanistan, bringing with their market diffusion a
cornucopia of violence and addiction. The Afghan
experience directly challenges Barnett’s Wilsonianism
as it suggests that the export of order from the core
to the periphery can be far outweighed by the export
of disorder from the periphery to the core. Another
example of this is the spillover of conflicts between
transnational criminal organizations from their home
states to host states. Indeed, “gang warfare or apparently random murders in Toronto or London that seem
senseless and anarchic within the context of those
societies take on a new, brutally rational meaning when
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analyzed within the context of the activities of gangs
back in Jamaica or Nigeria (or Russia, or Albania, or a
host of other countries).”78
Some of the disorder, however, will be more
widespread and even more intractable than criminal
or drug-related violence. This is particularly likely
in Western Europe where the clashes of religions
and civilization will be fuelled by a continuation of
demographic trends and the failure of policies designed
to integrate immigrant communities. In retrospect, the
Madrid and London bombings, as well as the Paris
riots in 2005, will be seen as the first salvos in what
is the functional equivalent of a low-grade civil war
that is likely to wrack Europe in the coming decades.
Some elements within immigrant Moslem populations
in Western Europe are reluctant to accept the authority
of the states within which they reside, and the backlash
against this is almost certain to fuel indigenous
nationalism.79
Another danger stemming from many of the
conditions enunciated above is that of a pandemic
of an emerging or reemerging disease. Urbanization,
underdevelopment, the gap between health care
services and needs in many cities, as well as urban
populations whose immunity is compromised by
both extreme environmental degradation and close
proximity to animals and fowl in confined spaces,
could all contribute to virulent outbreaks of emerging
or reemerging diseases. Trade and travel could rapidly
transform the outbreak from local to global in a few
days. Even with no ill will, the prospect for a rapidly
spreading epidemic is enormous. Add to this the
possibility of malevolence and the ability of terrorists
to deploy human biological weapons—infected people
on planes at airports and other dispersal nodes—
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and the scenario rapidly becomes worst case.80 If the
carriers are asymptomatic, unless there is a cessation
of international air travel, national borders will have
all the stopping power of tissue paper. And even if
there is a formal travel embargo, illegal migration is
unlikely to cease. Trafficking and smuggling of peoples
could undermine efforts at disease containment.81 And
even if they do not, the damaging consequences of a
pandemic will not be confined to the health sector.
The cascading effects into the economic domain could
be enormously damaging—a kind of globalization
interrupted that would hit the bottom one billion
even harder than anyone else. At the same time, the
inability of states to control and limit the pandemic
would further undermine public faith and confidence
in them. In extreme situations, people might even look
for comfort and support not to the state but to the
alternative forms of governance that are likely to be
equally overwhelmed but at least have the virtue of
proximity. To the extent that alternative governance
can provide some help, alternative loyalties to these
nonstate groups will be cemented, while faith in and
loyalty to the state will diminish even further.
Clearly, the prospects for global chaos are not as
remote as might be thought. Problems such as transnational organized crime, terrorism, and pandemics
could intersect and interact to create a tipping point
from “durable disorder” into chaos. When one adds to
the trends already discussed the strains coming from
global warming and environmental degradation, the
diminution of cheaply available natural resources, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
agenda becomes even more formidable. As states go
further into decline, some will inevitably collapse. It is
certainly not inconceivable that among these could be
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a nuclear weapons state. Conditions of chaos, looting,
and violence are not conducive to secure command
and control. A race for the acquisition of “loose nukes”
between states and nonstate actors, therefore, is not
out of the question. And if states lose this race, the
radical and sudden empowerment of nonstate actors
will demand an immediate reevaluation of many of
the orthodoxies about weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) terrorism.
The point about such contingencies is not that they
will necessarily happen, but that they represent a set of
threats and challenges that have multiple implications
for U.S. policy and strategy during the next few
decades. A key issue, therefore, is the extent to which
this has been recognized in the U.S. national security
community. The next section addresses this.
IV. U.S. THINKING ABOUT SECURITY
AND STRATEGY
There is no single or easy answer to the question
about threat recognition. The National Security Strategy
of 2006, for example, is unabashedly Wilsonian in
tone and optimistic in outlook. Although the Bush
administration is very different from its predecessor
in its willingness to use military force, the underlying
thrust of U.S. policy remains that articulated by the
Clinton administration—“engagement and enlargement.”82 The emphasis is on spreading democracy
and promoting development. Democracy is treated
as synonymous with good governance, while the
focus on development, although well-placed, does
little to help the bottom billion or the urban poor.
The idea of stability is given little attention. In terms
of threats, four categories are identified: traditional
threats from other states, irregular challenges from
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both state and nonstate actors, catastrophic challenges
involving acquisition and use of WMD, and disruptive
challenges from state and nonstate actors who employ
technologies and capabilities in novel ways to offset
U.S. military superiority. Not surprisingly, the list of
adversaries has broadened to include nonstate actors
such as terrorist and criminal organizations. The
strategy also recognizes that globalization presents
challenges such as pandemics, as well as illicit trade
and environmental destruction. The strategy notes that
although these are not traditional national security
concerns, “if left unaddressed they can threaten
national security.”83 The overall tone, however, is that
the United States is powerful enough to deal with both
threats and challenges.
Other documents are somewhat more cautious
in their optimism. The 2020 study conducted by
the National Intelligence Council, entitled Mapping
the Global Future, for example, focuses upon both
opportunities and dangers. While noting that the
likelihood of great power conflict is very low, it argues
that many governments and publics do not feel secure.
The study highlights both the positive and negative
consequences of globalization while also acknowledging that the process itself could be derailed by “a pervasive sense of economic and physical insecurity.”84
Mass casualty terrorist attacks, widespread cyber
attacks on infrastructures, or even a pandemic could
trigger efforts by “governments to put controls on the
flow of capital, goods, people,” and technologies, thereby
increasing transaction costs and dampening economic
growth.85 Even if this is avoided, “lagging economies,
ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions, and
youth bulges” could combine to create what the study
describes as a “perfect storm.”86 States with insufficient
capacity to meet expectations or reconcile conflicting
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demands are likely to “encounter the most severe and
most frequent outbreaks of violence.”87 These states,
for the most part, are in “a great arc of instability from
Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, into the
Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and South and
Central Asia and through parts of Southeast Asia.”88
Clearly, the 2020 report recognizes “that troubled and
institutionally weak states” will be a major security
challenge.89 For all its sophistication and subtlety,
however, the report focuses on particular states and
regions rather than systemic strains. It discusses the
possibility of state failure in specific circumstances
and locations but offers little more than a genuflection
to the notion of systemic state decline. Whereas the
2020 report suggests that some states will fail to meet
the Westphalian ideal, the argument here is that the
Westphalian system itself is increasingly eroding.
Another government document that provides
a highly sophisticated and very compelling, but
only partial, assessment of the emerging security
environment is The Joint Operational Environment (JOE).
Produced by the Joint Forces Command and presented
as a “living draft,” the JOE acknowledges that “the
United States will not operate in a single, static,
operational environment” but in “layers of operational
environments, all constantly in flux.”90 Inherent in
this assessment is the recognition that complexity
and connectedness will significantly influence the
operational environment for future conflicts. Moreover,
this environment will be characterized by nonlinearity
and cascading effects: “some of the smallest activities
and interactions cause the largest effects. No activity is
subject to successful prediction. Instead, outcomes will
be possibilities (potentialities unbound by constraint)
that undergo confirmation or denial processes.”91
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Although the JOE assessment of the future
geostrategic landscape acknowledges the “diffusion
of power away from central governments”92 and the
increasing influence of nonstate and transnational
actors, it still assumes that “nation-states will remain
principal actors.”93 In other respects, however, it
acknowledges the kind of dynamics that could tip the
system from the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age.
Many of the developments envisaged in the report
coincide with those discussed above. They include state
weakness and collapse, demographic time bombs, the
emergence of urban environments as centers of gravity
(and, therefore, areas of operation) with potential
for chaos and civil unrest, the likelihood that many
traditional challenges will morph into irregular ones,
the pervasiveness of criminal elements in operational
environments, and the importance of tribes, extended
families, and “super-empowered” individuals and
groups.94 Failed or failing states will be sanctuaries for
enemies who are flexible and adaptive. In spite of this
overlap, however, there are three critical differences
between the JOE assessment and the central thesis of
this monograph about the descent into the New Dark
Age.
The first is that the JOE very naturally focuses
on enemies to be defeated, whereas the argument
here is that the key issues revolve around conditions
of chaos, contagion effects, and the capacity of the
United States and other members of the international
community to mitigate consequences, restore order,
foster reconciliation and reconstruction, and ultimately
provide good governance where none exists. The
distinction is between purposeful threats from hostile
actors and threats posed by unmanageable and
chaotic conditions that have a significant prospect of
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spreading. To some extent, these conditions develop
from what Liotta terms “creeping vulnerabilities.”95 In
the context discussed here, however, they have become
dramatic, highly visible, and fast moving. To focus on
these conditions is not to deny the existence of enemies
who will flourish within chaos. Nor is it to ignore the
likely existence of spoilers who will seek to prevent the
restoration of order. Neutralizing enemies and dealing
with spoilers will be essential if the United States is
to have any chance of success in any intervention to
restore order. Moreover, providing a congenial security
environment will clearly be a prerequisite for success
in reestablishing governance. If military successes are
a necessary condition for successful management of
the kinds of contingencies that are likely to arise in
the New Dark Age, however, they are not a sufficient
condition.
Second, the analysis here is ultimately far more
pessimistic than that continued in the JOE. The JOE
assessment, at least implicitly, incorporates many of the
characteristics of the New Middle Ages. The argument
here is that we are already moving from the New Middle
Ages to the New Dark Age, and that the challenges of
security in an increasingly chaotic environment will be
even more formidable than they already are. In terms
of wicked problems, the frightening thing is that we
have not seen anything yet.
The third difference flows from this. Understandably there is a “can do” quality about the military operations envisaged as likely within the emerging joint
operational environment. Military planning after all is
designed for success not failure. Yet the difficulties the
United States has confronted in Iraq—although they
stemmed in part from no planning rather than poor
planning—suggest that the challenges are formidable,
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victory is difficult to define, and that military success
cannot easily be translated into political stability. Iraq
has revealed that state building is complex, protracted,
and expensive, and comes with no guarantee that
desired or anticipated outcomes can be achieved. Yet
Iraq also illustrates the kinds of conditions that are likely
to characterize the New Dark Age—albeit in multiple
locations rather than a single country. Unfortunately,
Iraq at its most intractable might be little more than a
poor approximation of the difficulties that will have to
be confronted in a world where chaos is both extensive
and intensive.
To summarize, the National Security Strategy has little
sense of the tectonic shocks that might be ahead, whereas
both the 2020 report and the JOE suggest that we will
typically have to confront quakes that are magnitude
8 or above on the Richter scale. The problem is that
future shocks could prove beyond the realm of current
experience—creating what Nassim Taleb has called
a “black swan” event.96 Put differently, the paradigm
shift involved in the transition from the New Middle
Ages to the New Dark Age is so profound that it might
require new kinds of responses to security challenges.
If the world moves in this direction and confronts the
United States with conditions of chaos rather than
simply a “durable disorder,” U.S. policymakers will
have to design a far more holistic approach to the
exercise of power. Against this background, the final
section explores the range of strategic options available
to the United States as it prepares for the possibility
that the New Middle Ages will be followed not by the
revitalization of the Westphalian state system but by a
decline into a New Dark Age.
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V. GLOBAL INSTABILITY AND U.S. STRATEGY
Even if the notion of a New Dark Age is dismissed
as a truly worst case scenario, a looming crisis of
governance and widening security deficits are harder
to ignore. They are inextricably linked to increasing
global instability. The decline of the state will both
reflect this rising tide and intensify it. Consequently,
instability could all too easily degenerate into a
tsunami of chaos—posing far-reaching challenges for
U.S. military forces as well as U.S. diplomatic and
global leadership. The signs are already evident. One
of the lessons of Iraq, for example, is that the resource
demands of state-building and economic reconstruction
are far greater than expected. Although the United
States, in effect, catalyzed the failure of the old Iraqi
state, the resulting chaos, factionalism, and violence
proved much harder to control than expected, even by
those who had serious reservations about the invasion.
If the outlook described above is even partially correct,
the implications for U.S. security and strategy are farreaching.
Yet the United States is not without some discretion
in how it responds to this world of global chaos.
Broadly speaking, there are three major choices:
interventionism, disengagement and mitigation, and
triage or selective interventionism. There are also, of
course, significant variations within the first and third,
depending on whether the United States acts alone or
in concert with other powers which are also willing
to try to shape the environment. For purposes of this
analysis, however, the focus is simply on the three
major options as this offers a clearer, not to say starker,
picture of the advantages and shortcomings of each
approach.
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The first of these is a highly interventionist strategy
which is designed explicitly to uphold the state
system, to contain disorder and chaos, and to reimpose
order and stability. In many respects, this offers a
continuation of the assertive and activist strategy
pursued by the Bush administration. The logic was
encapsulated in the National Security Strategy initially
enunciated in 2002 and refined in 2006. In the words
of the administration, this strategy reflects “the path of
confidence,” the choice of “leadership over isolationism
and the pursuit of free and fair trade and open markets
over protectionism.”97 It seeks to “deal with challenges
now rather than leaving them for future generations . . .
fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to
arrive in our country . . . shape the world, not merely be
shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead
of being at their mercy.”98 Although this is in some
respects very appealing, there are major problems with
a long-term extension of this highly activist strategy in
a chaotic world.
First, it suffers from stateocentrism. This has
already been evident in Iraq where the United States,
at the political level at least, has put all its faith into the
recreation of a unified central state. The difficulty with
this has been highlighted by the military’s alliance
with Sunni tribes which led to the “awakening” and
the defeat of al-Qaeda in Anbar province. This might
actually make it harder rather than easier for the central
government to consolidate its power. Empowering
the Sunni tribes tacitly disempowers the central
government.
Second, an interventionist strategy can all too easily
become indiscriminate. In some respects, this reflects
the fact that since terrorist threats can emanate from
anywhere to hurt the United States, security is globally
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indivisible. From this perspective, there are no longer
primary and secondary interests—there is only an
overriding interest in preventing disorderly spaces that
can provide terrorists safe havens. If the United States
envisages its role in terms of maintaining stability,
shaping the environment, minimizing disorder, and
preventing or eliminating chaos, the demands on
national resources will be enormous—and perhaps
unsustainable. For the United States to carry out a
strategy of this kind, at the very least, it would have
to expand the Army and Marine Corps—which are the
keys to successful interventions—beyond the increase
already projected. This would likely be at the expense
of the Navy and Air Force—which are typically more
concerned (again in a stateocentric way) about the
emergence of peer competitors than about military
interventions in chaotic contingencies. Even this,
however, might not be enough for what is potentially
an open-ended strategy.
More important than the size of the intervention
capability, however, would be its composition. In
confronting a deteriorating security environment of
the kind envisaged here, the United States would need
a far more holistic approach to the exercise of power
and a far more coherent organizational structure than
currently exist. In responding to security challenges,
the United States still tends to develop several strands
of distinct and often independent activities rather than
a sustained strategic approach that integrates multiple
activities and directs them towards a common purpose.
In a world where the United States seeks to combat
extensive disorder and restore stability, military,
economic, and diplomatic power have to be targeted
in ways that create synergies rather than seams, that
reinforce rather than undercut, and that provide
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maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Iraq has shown
that throwing money at problems is no longer enough.
In effect, U.S. interventions in the future would have to
be smarter, not harder.
Achieving this goal requires major institutional
change. As suggested above, the United States is
organized according to domains of activity—military,
diplomatic, economic, and so on. The problem is that
effective strategies of intervention and reconstruction
require more than the coordination of disparate
elements. Strategy cannot be patched together. At
the very least it requires going beyond interagency
collaboration to develop what might be termed
transagency organizational structures. Based on
but extending the task force concept, a transagency
structure would be a central core of U.S. interventionist
capabilities. It would include military forces, diplomats,
reconstruction specialists, and legal experts integrated
into one organization designed to assist a target
state in reestablishing its authority, legitimacy, and
effectiveness. For the United States, which historically
has extolled the virtues of fragmented government
structures in order to maintain checks and balances,
this would be a radical departure—perhaps too radical.
It would also run up against bureaucratic self-interest
and standard operational procedures. The danger is
that departments would ostensibly cooperate in what
has been termed a “whole of government” approach,
but that the deployment would simply reproduce in
the field the fissures, tensions, and divergent operating
philosophies that are so prevalent in Washington.99
The requirement, therefore, is to extend notions of joint
operations beyond the military to civilian institutions
and to develop transagency structures that are
cohesive, replace departmental loyalties with a sense
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of loyalty to the mission, and focus on synergistic
effects. Without both organizational innovation and a
shift of organizational cultures and loyalties, success is
unlikely.
In the final analysis, however, the real problem
with this activist strategy is cost. Even if the Iraq
involvement is not followed by an Iraq syndrome
resembling the Vietnam syndrome, the interventionist
strategy will almost certainly be difficult to sustain
because of resource constraints. Given the growing
signs of U.S. economic weakness, domestic programs
and demands, and the likelihood that other states
will not fully share U.S. concerns or assessments,
the prospects for long-term implementation of this
strategy are minimal. Overstretch would be inevitable
and would significantly erode mission effectiveness.
There would also be a need to recognize that not all
change can be successfully resisted—even when it is
for the worse—and not all problems can be solved.
Indeed, even if the United States did everything the
strategy requires and even if its power was augmented
on occasion by allies, the United States could end up
with its finger in the dike as the walls are crumbling all
around.
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that an
alternative and in some respects very attractive strategy
is one of distance and disengagement. Whereas the
interventionist strategy involves a mix of preventive
action and hands-on consequence management,
this alternative strategy is a mix of insulation and
mitigation. If the United States recognizes that disorder
and chaos are inescapable and that even with the
coherent deployment of all its military, diplomatic, and
economic power it cannot change this, then it might opt
for a strategy which focuses not on intervention but
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primarily on homeland security. In this case, it would
seek to insulate itself from the worst effects of global
chaos, try to ensure that it is not a primary target, and
seek to mitigate adverse consequences of breakdown
elsewhere. In effect, John Quincy Adams rather than
Woodrow Wilson would provide the leitmotif for
this strategy: America “goes not abroad, in search
of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the
freedom and independence of all. She is the champion
and vindicator only of her own.”100 This would be low
cost in terms of “blood and treasure” spent on foreign
interventions, and would allow the United States to
focus on domestic problems and economic challenges.
Attractive as this might appear, it has significant
shortcomings. First, neglect is not always benign.
Without a continued U.S. military role in upholding
at least some of the vestiges of international order,
the descent into chaos could be deeper, sharper, and
more long-lasting in its effects. In effect, the Dark Age
would be even darker without U.S. efforts to maintain
or restore order. Second, there is no guarantee that the
United States can effectively insulate itself and mitigate
adverse consequences of chaos in a world with even the
vestiges of globalization and connectivity. Even if the
United States succeeds in taking itself out of the line of
fire of terrorists, so long as it fosters trade and travel,
it will remain vulnerable to microbes, to economic
disruption, and to other spillover effects from the
growing chaos outside its borders. A disengagement
strategy, therefore, could prove to be both elusive and
illusory.
The third option offers a middle ground between
these two and could be described variously as selective
intervention, a triage strategy, or even as “prudential
realism.”101 In effect, this strategy would be based on the
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assumption that although these trends towards chaos
are global, their impact varies according to location,
circumstance, and even U.S. strategic interests. To put
it crudely, chaos in Mauritania is not as important for
the United States as chaos in Mexico. Even in a world
of global terrorism, some interests are more important
than others. Accordingly, the United States could opt
for selective interventions to deal with chaos or disorder
when it is a direct rather than indirect threat, when it is
proximate rather than distant, or when it takes on such
proportions that it could have highly disruptive and
far-reaching spillover effects.
This is a more differentiated approach than either
of the other two alternatives. In many respects, it
reflects a recent U.S. Army assessment of the strategic
environment which noted that “the stability and
legitimacy of the conventional political order in regions
vital to the United States is increasingly under pressure
from a variety of sources. There is now a nexus of
dangerous new actors, methods, and capabilities that
imperil the United States, its interests, and its alliances
in strategically significant ways.”102 These threats
require a response which is carefully formulated, with
an appropriate balance between ends, ways, and means,
and a realistic prospect of reaching an end state that
is less dangerous and unfavorable than it would be in
the event of inaction. In effect, the Weinberger-Powell
Doctrine could provide the framework for assessment,
albeit with one addendum—the United States should
not intervene if its intervention would lead to an increase rather than a decline in chaos and instability.
Even a strategy of limited and selective intervention,
however, has to be done right. Significantly, the Army
has not only enunciated at least some of the preconditions
for intervention, but also has emphasized the need
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for “integrated operations . . . in Joint, interagency,
and multinational environments.”103 In addition, it
has acknowledged the need to integrate the elements
of national power—diplomatic, military, economic,
and information.104 Taking this a step further and
developing the transagency organizational structures
discussed above might enhance the prospects that
these selective interventions would create the desired
results. Even selective interventions require the holistic
exercise of power and a more coherent organizational
approach than has been evident in Iraq.
The difficulty is that adaptation by the United
States is constrained by intense partisanship and by
an anachronistic set of institutional arrangements and
procedures for managing national security policy.
Gone are the days when politics stopped at the water’s
edge. Partisanship not only encourages the adoption
of extremes rather than more prudent and moderate
alternatives but also results in dramatic course
shifts when presidential incumbents are replaced
by members of the opposing party. Similarly, many
institutional arrangements in the United States are
unsuited to the demands of the 21st century. Reform
of American government in general and the national
security apparatus in particular might be a necessary—
albeit not a sufficient—condition for the United States
to function effectively in dealing with the challenges of
emerging global chaos.
The other constraints on the United States are
the increasingly obvious fiscal and economic trends.
In the short and medium terms, the possibility of a
U.S. economic meltdown and a global realignment of
economic power cannot be excluded. The ripple effects
of such an event would greatly intensify the trends and
tendencies towards the dissolution of the Westphalian
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order discussed above. Yet this might not be all bad.
In the final analysis, it is important to recognize that
state predominance is not immutable. The state does
not necessarily represent the optimum set of political
arrangements for meeting people’s needs or for
ensuring peace and stability. More organic, bottomup forms of governance, for all their shortcomings,
might be the best available in a world of increasingly
hollow states. The fixation with the centralized state
needs to confront realities that point at least towards
the serious consideration of alternatives. The problem
is that the stateocentric mode of thinking is so highly
normative that serious consideration of alternative
forms of governance, which does more than treat them
as threats, is typically regarded as heretical, irrelevant,
or misguided. Yet if we fail to see the decline of the
state and to recognize the underlying realities, the
prospect of a cascade of strategic surprises and a series
of strategic disasters is inescapable.
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